PANGANDAMAN vs CASAR

PANGANDAMAN vs CASAR

G.R. No. 71782, April 14, 1988

Facts: The shooting incident by armed men in Lanao led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners assert that the respondent Judge issued a warrant of arrest against fifty (50) “John Does” transgressing the Constitutional provision requiring that such warrants should particularly describe the persons or things to be seized.

Issue:  Whether said warrant is valid

Held: No.

Insofar as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) “John Does” not one of whom the witnesses to the complaint could or would identify, it is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional and once anathematized as “totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.”^[30] Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized,^[31] the warrant must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be voided.

WHEREFORE, the warrant complained of is upheld and declared valid insofar as it orders the arrest of the petitioners. Said warrant is voided to the extent that it is issued against fifty (50) “John Does.” The respondent Judge is directed to forward to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the record of the preliminary investigation of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 1748 of his court for further appropriate action.

Burgos vs Chief of Staff

Burgos vs Chief of Staff

G.R. No. L-64261, December 26, 1984

Facts:  Petitioners question the issuance of the two search warrants on the premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to have been used in subversive activities.

It is contended by petitioners that the documents necessitating the issuance of the subject warrants could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:

“SEC. 3. x x x and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”

Issue:  Whether the warrants were validly issued

Held: No.

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla’s application that petitioner “is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended x x x” is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a rinding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so.

Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, “that the evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and things above-described were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement.”

In mandating that “no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, x x x after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance,   this Court ruled that “the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.” As couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.

Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants.

Kho vs Makalintal

Kho vs Makalintal

G.R. No. 94902-06.  April 21, 1999

 

Facts: Petitioners sought to restrain the respondent NBI from  using the objects  seized  by virtue of such warrants in any case or cases filed or to be filed against them and to return immediately the said items, including the firearms, ammunition and explosives, radio communication equipment, hand sets, transceivers, two units of vehicles and  motorcycle.

Petitioners question the issuance of subject search warrants, theorizing upon the absence of any probable cause therefor.  They contend that the surveillance and investigation conducted by NBI agents within the premises involved, prior to the application for the search warrants under controversy, were not sufficient to vest in the applicants personal knowledge of facts and circumstances showing or indicating the commission of a crime by them (petitioners).

Issue: Whether petitioners’ contention of the absence of probable cause in the given situation is tenable.

Held: Petitioners’ contention is untenable.  Records show that the NBI agents who conducted the surveillance and investigation testified unequivocably that they saw guns being carried to and unloaded at the two houses searched, and motor vehicles and spare parts were stored therein.  In fact, applicant Max B. Salvador declared that he personally attended the surveillance together with his witnesses (TSN, May 15, 1990, pp. 2-3), and the said witnesses personally saw the weapons being unloaded from motor vehicles and carried to the premises referred to.  NBI Agent Ali Vargas testified that he actually saw the firearms being unloaded from a Toyota Lite-Ace van and brought to the aformentioned house in BF Homes, Paranaque because he was there inside the compound posing as an appliance agent  (TSN, May 15, 1990, pp. 4-5).  It is therefore decisively clear that the application for the questioned search warrants was based on the personal knowledge of the applicants and their witnesses.

In the case of Central Bank v. Morfe (20 SCRA 507), this Court ruled that the question of whether or not a probable cause exists is one which must be determined in light of  the conditions obtaining in given situations.  In Luna v. Plaza (26 SCRA 310), it held that the existence of a probable cause depends to a large extent upon the finding or opinion of the judge who conducted the required examination of the applicants and the witnesses.

After a careful study, the Court discerns no basis for disturbing the findings and conclusions arrived at by the respondent Judge after examining the applicants and witnesses.  Respondent judge had the singular opportunity to assess their testimonies and to find out their personal knowledge of facts and circumstances enough to create a probable cause.   The Judge was the one who personally examined the applicants and witnesses and who asked searching questions vis-a-vis the applications for search warrants.  He was thus able to observe and determine whether subject applicants and their witnesses gave accurate accounts of the surveillance and investigation they conducted at the premises to be searched.  In the absence of any showing that respondent  judge was recreant of his duties in connection with the personal examination he so conducted on the affiants before him, there is no basis for doubting the reliability and correctness of his findings and impressions.

Placer vs Villanueva

Placer vs Villanueva

G.R. Nos. 60349-62, December 29, 1983

Facts: Following receipt of  informations from petitioners that probable cause has been established which necessitates the issuance of warrants of arrest, respondent judge issued an order the hearing of said criminal cases for the purpose of determining the propriety of issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest.  After said hearing, respondent issued the questioned orders requiring petitioners to submit to the court the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in support of the informations to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners

Petitioners contended that under P.D. Nos. 77 and 911, they are authorized to determine the existence of a probable cause in a preliminary examination/investigation, and that their findings as to the existence thereof constitute sufficient basis for the issuance of warrants of arrest by the court.

Issues: Whether the certification of the investigating fiscal in the information as to the existence of probable cause obligates respondent City Judge to issue a warrant of arrest.

Whether or not the respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest, compel the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other documentary evidence presented during the preliminary investigation.

Held: 1. No.  2. Yes.

The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate.  This is clear from the following provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court:

“Warrant of arrest, when issued. – If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer that the offense complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest.”

Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest.  If on the face of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s certification and require the submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause.  This has been the rule since U.S. vs. Ocampo and Amarga vs. Abbas.  And this evidently is the reason for the issuance by respondent of the questioned orders of April 13, 15, 16, 19, 1982 and July 13, 1982.  Without the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other evidence which, as a matter of long-standing practice had been attached to the informations filed in his sala, respondent found the informations inadequate bases for the determination of probable cause.  For as the ensuing events would show, after petitioners had submitted the required affidavits, respondent wasted no time in issuing the warrants of arrest in the cases where he was satisfied that probable cause existed.

The obvious purpose of requiring the submission of affidavits of the complainant and of his witnesses is to enable the court to determine whether to dismiss the case outright or to require further proceedings.

Lim vs Felix

Lim vs Felix

G.R. Nos. 94054-57, February 19, 1991

Facts: At the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin.  Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound.  For the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder, the accused were Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94054-57), Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94266-69.) The RTC of Masbate concluded that a probable cause has been established for the issuance of warrants of arrest. In the same Order, the court ordered the arrest of the petitioners plus bail for provisional liberty.

The entire records of the case were transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate.  Respondent Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane was designated to review the case. A petition to transfer the venue of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate to the Regional Trial Court of Makati was filed by petitioners and granted by the SC.

On July 5, 1990, the respondent court (RTC Makati) issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein.  The respondent Judge said:

“In the instant cases, the preliminary investigation was conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate which found the existence of probable cause that the offense of multiple murder was committed and that all the accused are probably guilty thereof, which was affirmed upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor who properly filed with the Regional Trial Court four separate informations for murder.  Considering that both the two competent officers to whom such duty was entrusted by law have declared the existence of probable cause, each information is complete in form and substance, and there is no visible defect on its face, this Court finds it just and proper to rely on the prosecutor’s certification in each information xxx”

Issue: Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution’s certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists

Held: No.

The Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution which requires “x x x probable cause to be personally determined by the Judge x x x”, not by any other officer or person.

If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause.  The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor.  The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied.  The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.

The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners.  There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution.  He could not possibly have known what transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification.  Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the petitioners’ motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere certification and recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.

Tatad vs Secretary of Energy

Tatad vs Secretary of Energy

G.R. No. 124360.  November 5, 1997

 

Facts: The petitions challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled “An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes.” R.A. No. 8180 ends twenty six (26) years of government regulation of the downstream oil industry.

Issue:     Whether or not RA 8180 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional.

Held: Yes.

In the cases at bar, it  cannot be denied that our  downstream oil industry is  operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that.  Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as  the only major  league players in the oil  market.  All other players  belong to  the lilliputian league.   As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities.  The tariff differential of 4%  therefore  works to their  immense benefit.  Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential.  The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors.  It erects  a high barrier to the entry of new players.   New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building  refineries  of their own will have to spend  billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%.  They will be competing on an uneven field.  The argument that the 4% tariff differential  is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse.  The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives.  Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry  is  an idle dream.

The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of  Petron, Shell and Caltex against  prospective new players.   Petron, Shell and Caltex can easily comply with the inventory requirement of R.A. No. 8180 in view of their existing storage facilities.  Prospective competitors again will find compliance with this requirement difficult as it will entail a prohibitive cost.  The construction cost of storage facilities and the cost of inventory can thus scare prospective players.  Their net effect is to further occlude the entry points of new players, dampen competition and enhance the control of the market by the three (3) existing oil companies.

RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the “new players” insofar as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the established oil companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions already being observed by the latter.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are granted.  R.A. No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional and E.O. No. 372 void.

Coconut Oil Refiners Association vs Torres

Coconut Oil Refiners Association vs Torres

G.R. No. 132527.  July 29, 2005

 

Facts: This is a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction seeking to enjoin and prohibit the Executive Branch, through the public respondents Ruben Torres in his capacity as Executive Secretary, the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), the Clark Development Corporation (CDC) and the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), from allowing, and the private respondents from continuing with, the operation of tax and duty-free shops located at the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ), and to declare the following issuances as unconstitutional, illegal, and void:

1.  Section 5 of Executive Order No. 80,^[1] dated April 3, 1993, regarding the CSEZ.

2.  Executive Order No. 97-A, dated June 19, 1993, pertaining to the SSEZ.

3.  Section 4 of BCDA Board Resolution No.  93-05-034,^[2] dated May 18, 1993, pertaining to the CSEZ.

Petitioners contend that the aforecited issuances are unconstitutional and void as they constitute executive lawmaking, and that they are contrary to Republic Act No. 7227^[3] and in violation of the Constitution, particularly Section 1, Article III (equal protection clause), Section 19, Article XII (prohibition of unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade), and Section 12, Article XII (preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods).

Issue: Whether the issuances are unconstitutional for supposedly violating the equal protection clause

Held: No.

It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable classification. Classification, to be valid, must  (1) rest on substantial distinction, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.

Applying the foregoing test to the present case, this Court finds no violation of the right to equal protection of the laws. First, contrary to petitioners’ claim, substantial distinctions lie between the establishments inside and outside the zone, justifying the difference in their treatment.  In Tiu v. Court of Appeals, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 97-A was challenged for being violative of the equal protection clause. In that case, petitioners claimed that Executive Order No. 97-A was discriminatory in confining the application of Republic Act No. 7227 within a secured area of the SSEZ, to the exclusion of those outside but are, nevertheless, still within the economic zone.

Upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 97-A, this Court therein found substantial differences between the retailers inside and outside the secured area, thereby justifying a valid and reasonable classification:

Certainly, there are substantial differences between the big investors who are being lured to establish and operate their industries in the so-called “secured area” and the present business operators outside the area. On the one hand, we are talking of billion-peso investments and thousands of new jobs.  On the other hand, definitely none of such magnitude. In the first, the economic impact will be national; in the second, only local. Even more important, at this time the business activities outside the “secured area” are not likely to have any impact in achieving the purpose of the law, which is to turn the former military base to productive use for the benefit of the Philippine economy. There is, then, hardly any reasonable basis to extend to them the benefits and incentives accorded in R.A. 7227. Additionally, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, it will be easier to manage and monitor the activities within the “secured area,” which is already fenced off, to prevent “fraudulent importation of merchandise” or smuggling.

It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws. As long as there are actual and material differences between territories, there is no violation of the constitutional clause. And of course, anyone, including the petitioners, possessing the requisite investment capital can always avail of the same benefits by channeling his or her resources or business operations into the fenced-off free port zone.

The Court in Tiu found real and substantial distinctions between residents within the secured area and those living within the economic zone but outside the fenced-off area.  Similarly, real and substantial differences exist between the establishments herein involved.  A significant distinction between the two groups is that enterprises outside the zones maintain their businesses within Philippine customs territory, while private respondents and the other duly-registered zone enterprises operate within the so-called “separate customs territory.” To grant the same tax incentives given to enterprises within the zones to businesses operating outside the zones, as petitioners insist, would clearly defeat the statute’s intent to carve a territory out of the military reservations in Subic Bay where free flow of goods and capital is maintained.

The classification is germane to the purpose of Republic Act No. 7227. As held in Tiu, the real concern of Republic Act No. 7227 is to convert the lands formerly occupied by the US military bases into economic or industrial areas. In furtherance of such objective, Congress deemed it necessary to extend economic incentives to the establishments within the zone to attract and encourage foreign and local investors.  This is the very rationale behind Republic Act No. 7227 and other similar special economic zone laws which grant a complete package of tax incentives and other benefits.

The classification, moreover, is not limited to the existing conditions when the law was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, inasmuch as the law envisioned the former military reservation to ultimately develop into a self-sustaining investment center.

And, lastly, the classification applies equally to all retailers found within the “secured area.” As ruled in Tiu, the individuals and businesses within the “secured area,” being in like circumstances or contributing directly to the achievement of the end purpose of the law, are not categorized further.  They are all similarly treated, both in privileges granted and in obligations required.

With all the four requisites for a reasonable classification present, there is no ground to invalidate Executive Order No. 97-A for being violative of the equal protection clause.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED.  Section 5 of Executive Order No. 80 and Section 4 of BCDA Board Resolution No. 93-05-034 are hereby declared NULL and VOID and are accordingly declared of no legal force and effect. Respondents are hereby enjoined from implementing the aforesaid void provisions. All portions of Executive Order No. 97-A are valid and effective, except the second sentences in paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 of said Executive Order, which are hereby declared INVALID.

Chavez vs PCGG

Chavez vs PCGG

G.R. No. 130716.  December 9, 1998

Facts:  Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG’s task of recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.  He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of “paramount public interest,” since it has a “debilitating effect on the country’s economy” that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people.  Hence, the people in general have a right to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government.

Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs.  They claim, though, that petitioner’s action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements.  And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.

Issues: Whether the constitutional right to information may prosper against respondents’ argument that the “should be disclosed” proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements are not yet effective and binding

Held: Yes.

Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth, subject to some of the following recognized restrictions:  (1) national security matters and intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  The General and Supplemental Agreements dated December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared NULL  AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution.  Respondent PCGG, its officers and all government functionaries and officials who are or may be directly  or  indirectly  involved  in  the  recovery  of  the  alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their associates are DIRECTED to disclose to the public the terms of any proposed compromise settlement, as well as the final agreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth, in accordance with the discussions embodied in this Decision.

Tan vs Del Rosario

Tan vs Del Rosario

G.R. No. 109289, October 03, 1994

Facts:  In G.R. No. 109289, it is asserted that the enactment of Republic Act No. 7496 violates the following provisions of the Constitution:

“Article VI, Section 26(1) – Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.”

“Article VI, Section 28(1) – The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.”

“Article III, Section 1 – No person shall be deprived of x x x property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.”

Issue: Whether or not RA 7496 violates Article III Section 1 (equal protection of the laws)

Held: No.

Petitioner intimates that Republic Act No. 7496 desecrates the constitutional requirement that taxation “shall be uniform and equitable” in that the law would now attempt to tax single proprietorships and professionals differently from the manner it imposes the tax on corporations and partnerships. The contention clearly forgets, however, that such a system of income taxation has long been the prevailing rule even prior to Republic Act No. 7496.

Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities (Juan Luna Subdivision vs. Sarmiento, 91 Phil. 371). Uniformity does not forfend classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class (Pepsi Cola vs. City of Butuan, 24 SCRA 3; Basco vs. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 771).

What may instead be perceived to be apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative intent to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular approach in the income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and large, the present global treatment on taxable corporations. The court does not view this classification to be arbitrary and inappropriate.

People vs Vera

People vs Vera

G. R. No. 45685, November 16, 1937

Facts:  The Probation Law provided that the probation system shall be applicable only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer.

Issue: Whether Act No. 4221 (Probation Law) is violative of the equal protection clause and is therefore unconstitutional.

Held:Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void.

This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the three grand departments of our government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivisions thereof, and on many constitutional powers, like the police power, taxation and eminent domain.

In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial boards. On that hypothesis, every person coming within the purview of the Probation Act would be entitled to avail of the benefits of the Act. Neither will there be any resulting inequality if no province, through its provincial board, should appropriate any amount for the salary of the probation officer—which is the situation now—and, also, if we accept the contention that, for the purposes of the Probation Act, the City of Manila should be considered as a province and that the municipal board of said city has not made any appropriation for the salary of a probation officer. These different situations suggested show, indeed, that while inequality may result in the application of the law and in the conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever may be the case, it is clear that section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant authorities requiring actual denial of the equal protection of the law before courts should assume the task of setting aside a law vulnerable on that score, but premises and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that account bad. We see no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition.