REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA, HENRICO UVERO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 79732 November 8, 1993
Facts: The Republic of the Philippines has sought the expropriation of certain portions of land owned by the private respondents. The latter demand that the just compensation for the property should be based on fair market value and not that set by Presidential Decree No. 76, as amended, which fixes payment on the basis of the assessment by the assessor or the declared valuation by the owner, whichever is lower. The RTC ruled for the private respondents. The CA affirmed said decision. Hence, the instant petition by the Republic.
In Export Processing Zone Authority (“EPZA”) vs. Dulay, etc. et al., the Court held the determination of just compensation in eminent domain to be a judicial function and it thereby declared Presidential Decree No. 76, as well as related decrees, including Presidential Decree No. 1533, to the contrary extent, as unconstitutional and as an impermissible encroachment of judicial prerogatives. The ruling, now conceded by the Republic was reiterated in subsequent cases.
Issue: Whether the declaration of nullity of the law in question should have prospective, not retroactive, application.
Held: There are two views on the effects of a declaration of the unconstitutionality of a statute:
The first is the orthodox view. Under this rule, as announced in Norton v. Shelby, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no right; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been passed. It is therefore stricken from the statute books and considered never to have existed at all. Not only the parties but all persons are bound by the declaration of unconstitutionality, which means that no one may thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in subsequent cases. It is, in other words, a total nullity.
The second or modern view is less stringent. Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. The court may give its reasons for ignoring or disregarding the law, but the decision affects the parties only and there is no judgment against the statute. The opinion or reasons of the court may operate as a precedent for the determination of other similar cases, but it does not strike the statute from the statute books; it does not repeal, supersede, revoke, or annul the statute. The parties to the suit are concluded by the judgment, but no one else is bound.
The orthodox view is expressed in Article 7 of the Civil Code, providing that “when the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. . . .
An otherwise valid law may be held unconstitutional only insofar as it is allowed to operate retrospectively such as, in pertinent cases, when it vitiates contractually vested rights. To that extent, its retroactive application may be so declared invalid as impairing the obligations of contracts. A judicial declaration of invalidity, it is also true, may not necessarily obliterate all the effects and consequences of a void act occurring prior to such a declaration.
The fact of the matter is that the expropriation cases, involved in this instance, were still pending appeal when the EPZA ruling was rendered and forthwith invoked by said parties. The appellate court in this particular case committed no error in its appealed decision. The instant petition is dismissed.
Some Law Notes 